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Abstract 
 
Since 1999 when it began the process of establishing the European Security and 
Defence Policy as an operating part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy many problems 
and issues have emerged, but also the need for cooperation with NATO. The EU through the 
ESDP has obtained the possibility for undertaking autonomous actions, but only by the 
requirement of "separable but not separate" capabilities. This paper aims to elaborate the 
problems that appear on the international scene during the undertaking of operations and the 
participation of NATO and EU member-states. Operations undertaken solely by the EU through 
ESDP with participation of NATO member-states, create difficulties in decision-making and 
cooperation, and thus interfere in the way the two organizations understands the concept of 
security. Further problems arose by the (un)necessary duplication of existing efforts and 
abilities, spending resources and the creation of a second set of military capabilities, as NATO 
and EU do not possess identical abilities, but rely on national contributions. For this purpose, 
the paper determines and elaborates five factors that affect the relationship between NATO and 
the EU/ESDP, as well as the development of mutual consultation and cooperation for the 
purpose of improving the relations. The conclusion includes proposals for solving mutual 
problems by answering several questions. Future actions of the two organizations, although they 
should act as joint venture partners for the maintenance of international peace and stability, will 
face with problems and deficiencies in cooperation, because of the different perceptions of the 
concept of security. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: SOME OF THE EVENTS BEFORE 
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY  
 
Several years before the Cologne Summit and the creation of European Security and 
Defence Policy, NATO started to strengthen its European pillar through development of the 
European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) responding to European requests and contribute 
for the security of the Alliance.
1
 NATO helped in creating the ESDI, but not as a fully 
independent entity, but in the frame of NATO, drawing out from capabilities as “separable, but 
not separate”. Most of the work was done during the NATO’s foreign ministers and defence 
ministers meetings in Berlin and Brussels in June 1996, at the end resulting with Berlin-Brussels 
agreement and creation of the possibility for the EU to become military-effective organization.  
On 4
th
 of December 1998, United Kingdom and France hold a meeting in St. Malo and 
adopted a Declaration, giving new meaning to the ESDI in the frame of NATO.
2
 The 
Declaration from St. Malo is invocation for acceleration of the implementation process of what 
was anticipated in the Treaty of Amsterdam - formulating common defence policy. Although 
the Declaration refers to the ESDI in NATO, it endeavours for the EU to possess capacity for 
autonomous actions, requiring necessary structures and capacities in areas where NATO as a 
whole or USA have superiority and where Europe is dependent. 
After St. Malo, key focus was put on NATO’s Summit in Washington in April 1999, 
where the allies acknowledged EU’s determination to possess the capacity for autonomous 
actions, to decide and approve military actions in areas where NATO is not engaged.
3
 NATO’s 
Strategic Concept agreed that the ESDI should continue to develop, helping European allies to 
act autonomously based on each case and by consensus, as well as to make its assets and 
capabilities available for operations where the Alliance is not military engaged.
4
 
 
2. CREATION OF THE ESDP 
 
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was created at the European 
Council Summit in Cologne in June 1999, when stared the development of military and civilian 
capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management and strengthening the EU’s capacity 
for external actions.
5
 As far as the military capabilities for crisis management, member-states at 
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the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, introduced the Headline Goal declaring that EU is 
capable of setting 60.000 troops, deployable for 60 days and sustainable for one year.
6
  In 2004, 
the Headline Goal was further elaborated in Headline Goal 2010 introducing the concept of 
battle groups, European Security Agency and civilian-military cells. At the Nice Summit in 
December 2000 new innovations were created such as the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Personnel (EUMP).
7
  At the 
Laeken Summit in December 2001, the European Council officially confirmed that the Union is 
capable of undertaking wide range of military and civilian crisis management operations from 
peace missions and rule of law to protection of human rights. 
Following these initiatives, by the European Council Summit in Santa Maria de Feira, 
EU made major steps in developing ESDP modalities, not only in the military area, but also in 
the civilian crisis management.
8
 Therefore, the EU member-states agreed in creating an Action 
Plan for introducing four priority areas: police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening the 
civil administration and civil protection. With the Civilian headline goal 2008
9
, these four areas 
were complemented with two new areas: monitoring and support for EU’s Special 
Representatives. Also, other measures were undertaken for improvement of the ESDP civilian 
capabilities: Committee responsible for civilian aspect of the crisis management, Civilian 
Response Teams and European Gendarmerie Force were established. 
 
3. COOPERATION WITH USA AND NATO 
 
At NATO’s foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on 8th of December 1998, USA gave 
its first response regarding St. Malo Declaration, underlining the support for ESDI through 
measures for increase of capabilities. While emphasising the support, at the same time, USA 
placed three standards for evaluation, known as the “Three D’s”.  
 De-linking - autonomous activity by EU along with the absence of “separable, but not 
separate” and to avoid appropriation of NATO decisions regarding ESDI;  
 Discriminating - to avoid discrimination against NATO member-states that are not EU 
members; and 
 Duplicating - to avoid duplication of the existing efforts and capabilities, spending 
resources and creating second set of capabilities. 
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USA viewed on ESDP through NATO’s objective, respectively as a controversy that 
represents a threat for NATO and USA influence in Europe, especially after the introduction of 
the Headline Goal. EU statements for autonomy, self preservation and independence reflected 
the ambitions and visions which may threaten the instutional designation after the Cold War. 
Whatever happens in Europe, of political and economic reasons, USA not have the possibility to 
withdrawal, although reserves regarding ESDP shall exist. 
As most of the European states are both EU and NATO members (with de facto “double 
veto”), at first sight disturbed USA, as they had problems with the situation where Europe is 
becoming more and more parasitic and, at the same time, more united. However, USA and EU 
reached new level in mutual relations from two directions. First is the fact that the ESDP 
basically changed the institutional designation and the shape of transatlantic connection. Second 
is that USA feels satisfied of reasons that Europe may take grater responsibility for its security, 
while USA may focus on new priorities, such as homeland security. This does not mean that the 
USA have no concerns for Europe, that NATO is out of use or that transatlantic relations are 
disrupted. USA and ESDP focus on homeland security is not because of strategis disagreement, 
but development of new relations out of the traditional transatlantic ones. 
NATO’s view is no longer relevant and it is in interest of USA to maintein wider 
perception of ESDP and European security arrangements. For all elements, except the European 
collective defence and peace-keeping in Europe, EU may be more interested partner in global 
conflict prevention than the European pillar in NATO. The development of parthership is not 
going to solve the debates regarding European priorities, securing budgets, NATO-EU relations, 
as these issues are going to be solved in a different and more constructive manner. Europe 
wishes to be treated on same level with USA, at the same time maintaining its national agendas 
and close bilateral contacts, as well as to prove its value as a strategic partner in global security. 
 
3.1 Factors Regarding the Relations Between NATO and ESDP 
 
Since Helsinki decisions, attention started to focus on quality of relations between 
NATO and ESDP. Three reasons were of particular significance. First, the risk that a competitor 
may emerge; second, effort in creating the ESDP structures; and third, the “unnecessary” in the 
word “duplicating” could be removed as the European states saw the opportunity in creating its 
own structures. Five other factors influenced the relations between NATO and ESDP: (1) 
military and economic cultures; (2) size of armament; (3) European NATO members; (4) 
military manufacture and trade; and (5) crisis management. 
Military and economic cultures. One factor was the progressive decreasing of the 
WEU role, which in years served as a “buffer” between the NATO and the EU. Issues regarding 
defence in the EU, if not solved by NATO, were transferred to WEU. After Helsinki, these 
buffer zones progressively disappeared.  
Armament relations. Since Helsinki, it became clear that NATO and ESDP are going 
to cooperate and mutually coordinate regarding the military planning. Since some European 
states started to press the ESDP for “autonomous” capability and creating special planning 
capabilities, for NATO this was a risk, especially by the need of creating homogenous 
connection among those operations which EU is not able to undertake and the potential 
involvement of NATO if the military threat escalates to a point where it must be involved. At 
the same way, NATO should need to know ESDP intentions regarding operations, in order to 
assess which military assets may be at disposal. 
Decision-making and European alliance in NATO. The development of ESDP 
institutions raised the question regarding the decision-making, as well as the way in which non-
EU NATO members are able to participate in ESDP military operations. Still, the main question 
is: Does the EU member-states acts as a single community in NATO? The answer may have a 
practical effect in execution of NATO matters, especially in the North-Atlantic Council working 
on consensus. Such consensus is based on understanding that no allied state is prepared to give 
up its right on others to determine the circumstances in which their military forces are put on 
risks and that, after the consensus is reached, NATO respects its commitments. But, if European 
alliance in NATO emerges, the way in which the North-Atlantic Council operates will change. 
Defence productivity and trade. With ESDP development, several questions arise 
regarding the European defence industry. First, USA started to call on European states to keep 
pace with defence industry in order to create mutual partnership. Second, European states 
started giving bigger significance on assets for production of defence goods. Third, the USA 
pressure to stabilize European defence expenditures increased Europe’s interest regarding the 
role of domain defence industries, rather than their assurance from the USA. Fourth, European 
states acknowledged the need of undertaking efforts for strengthening the industrial and 
technological defence basis in order to be competitive, dynamic and to improve the industrial 
defence cooperation. Fifth, defence industrial relations are more and more under influence of 
the USA military technology vis-à-vis European partners.  
Crises management. ESDP is designed to function as a CFSP instrument, contrary to 
NATO being more independent. The Alliance never developed a successful mechanism for 
crisis management. On the other side ESDP is designed and construct to have responsibilities 
for crisis management, capacity to confront with the situation from the beginning to the end. 
The European Council gave the mandate of establishing a mechanism for non-military crisis 
management and use of non-military instruments in order to coordinate and make more efficient 
the civilian measures and resources at the disposal of the EU and its member-states.  This 
should not be seen as a challenge to NATO, but rather as a peak of own lack of competence. 
3.2 Developing Consultations and Improvement of Relations 
 
EU in Santa Maria de Feira established formal arrangements for dialog, consultations 
and cooperation in crisis management, keeping its decision-making autonomy. The exchanges 
with European non-EU NATO members are realizing on the basis of nature and function of EU-
led operations, using NATO assets and capabilities. In periods with no crisis there shall be two 
meetings during each EU presidency, as well as two meetings with non-EU NATO member-
states. In addition, two phases distinguish in times of crisis: in pre-operational phase, dialog and 
consultations are intensive on all levels, by the time Council decision is made. If the possibility 
for use of NATO’s assets and capabilities is considered, attention is put on consultations with 
European non-EU NATO member-states. During operational phase, European non-EU NATO 
member-states may participate in operations if there is a will and if NATO’s assets and 
capabilities are being used. In case when assets and capabilities are not included, they may be 
invited to participate by Council decision. 
The Nice Summit signalized the determination of member-states for making the 
necessary effort regarding the improvement of their operational capabilities, especially in areas 
where European states rely on NATO. The Summit underlined the cooperation build with 
NATO on principles of consultation, cooperation and transparency, as well as the modalities for 
EU access to NATO’s assets and capabilities. In one of the Presidency conclusion annexes, EU 
member-states draw out a distinction between situations where and where not the NATO’s 
assets and capabilities are going to be involved. In the first case, non-EU NATO members are 
involved, according NATO procedures. But, in the second case, where non-NATO EU members 
are invited to participate, they may dispatch liaison officers for information exchange and 
operational planning. Such formulation had particular implications for non-EU NATO members 
with Turkey being most offended by the sense of expulsion from EU membership. Without full 
engagement, Turkey may find in a position where an operation is executing in its neighbour, 
attacking its interests, but with no possibility for active participation in all phases. 
Since then, the relations rapidly improved, at the same time seeking means for resolving 
the key opened issues during meetings between the North-Atlantic Council and the PSC.
10
 The 
ambassadors of the two institutions are meeting six times a year, and foreign ministers two 
times a year. Regarding the role non-EU NATO members played in the ESDP process, it is 
agreed that NATO shall work with consensus, and PSC rely on decisions when some of the non-
EU NATO members interests are involved; meaning no mission without consensus. 
Further improvements were reached in formal and informal efforts for resolving the 
remaining issues. These issues included: importance in strengthening European military 
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capabilities for NATO missions and EU-led operations where the Alliance is not engaged; value 
on non-European allies forces; bilateral meetings with non-European allies forces for 
confirmation and evaluation of the contribution in the European crisis management; EU’s 
acknowledge for the need of capabilities improvement; strengthening the nature of EU’s 
Headline Goal; and consultations between EU and non-EU NATO member-states. 
Improvements were also made in following areas: EU secures the access to NATO’s operational 
planning, access to NATO’s assets; identification of EU’s command options for fully and 
efficient undertaking of its responsibilities; and adaptation to NATO’s defence planning. Also, 
institutional concerns reflected the reality that most of the EU member-states are NATO allies 
and that the NATO decisions are adopted as long as there is a consensus. This illustrates the 
overlay membership value and international consultations; a pressure to reach agreement in EU 
and the formal consensus in NATO. 
 
3.3 Proposals for Mutual Problems 
 
NATO first. A full European commitment is needed on the principle “where NATO as 
a whole is not engaged” and political processes needs to develop in order to secure that there 
shall be no doubts about this point or regarding NATO’s capability at the beginning of the 
crisis. Most of the European states shall consider this as an implication of “NATO first”, but it 
is important for maintaining NATO’s cohesion. 
Shared risks/shared effort. A confirmation for NATO’s main principle that risks 
should be shared among allies is needed; and that there should be no share of efforts between 
NATO and ESDP or implicitly regarding some allies. The avoidance of sharing efforts is not 
only what EU member-states are doing regarding ESDP, but also the USA’s will is critical for 
engagement in operations falling under NATO’s article 5. 
Cooperative planning. Defence planning methods should be common and compatible, 
meaning unique set of processes. Cooperation should include mutual planning, governed by 
NATO, with full participation of the EUPM. Furthermore, military logic instructs need of just 
one methodology, regarding command, control, communications and intelligence. At the same 
time, EU should select potential command arrangement before the crises occur. 
Defence expenditures and capabilities. European governments should dedicate 
themselves on higher defence expenditures. Emphasis should be put on production, capabilities 
and interoperability, not only as a issue of mutual relations, but also as a critical issue for NATO 
as a whole, and allies should avoid duplication of NATO’s assets available for ESDP.  
Interoperability. EU through ESDP needs to focus its force modernization on 
interoperability with NATO. It is particularly critical not to develop two sets of interoperability, 
leading to implicit division of labour among allies. Furthermore, interoperability is critical if 
USA expects to be capable for execution of military operations with the allies outside of 
Europe, whether formally through NATO or as coalition of will. NATO with double technology 
may not be able to execute operations out of area covered by article 5.  
NATO’s crisis management. NATO should develop means to connect with the crisis 
management mechanism, along with ESDP relations. Also, priority arrangement is needed that 
the NATO-EU dialog shall be deepen, wide, gradual and effective on all levels for every future 
crisis that may affect both institutions. If the crises occur suddenly, most likely there shall be 
numerous informal exchanges and consultations between NATO and ESDP, in frame of their 
bureaucracies and bilaterally with other governments. Even with NATO-ESDP cooperation, 
doubts whether USA shall be willing to share risks with other allies in peace-keeping missions 
creates worries regarding NATO’s capacity to operate as a effective crisis management actor. 
Political and strategic dialogs. There should be political and military dialog on all 
levels between ESDP and NATO and member-states.  Quality dialog on this issue is significant 
if the share of labour and risk do not become too irritating in mutual relations. Wrong evaluation 
of USA’s pressure for share of labour with European states may be interpreted, not as an effort 
for consolidation of NATO, but as stimulation for the increase of ESDP’s role and influence. 
Managing rhetoric and ambitions. EU must practice limitations and clarity in its 
rhetoric about what ESDP is. There is a risk that ESDP declarations might be taken for granted 
and start to believe that USA might do much less military in Europe, than the actual ESDP 
capabilities would guarantee. It is of significant importance that those EU member-states, 
mostly concerned with trans-Atlantic relation, to secure that the decision-making autonomy and 
acting through ESDP is not going to be the central focus of the European pillar, but it is to be 
held in perspective regarding other security purposes. 
Defence cooperation. Effective NATO-EU dialog should be developed on defence 
cooperation among governments and needs to focus on five principles: (1) mutual NATO-EU 
market; (2) exchange of defence high technology; (3) developing common standards and 
measures for protection; (4) emphasizing interoperability for defence cooperation; and (5) 
securing new technologies in order to allow compatibility with NATO’s military equipment. 
Use of military force and leadership. Continual strategic dialog in NATO needs to 
exist about military capabilities and defence expenditures. The latter suggestion in a way is 
harder to implement, but in a long-term probably the most important for NATO’s future and 
ESDP development. For NATO and ESDP, building, training, sustainability and deployment of 
military forces must be connected with the expectations. For democracies to continue on 
spending significant funds on defence, strategic analysis, political vision and dialog among 
states and institutions are necessary. 
 
4. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: PRACTICAL STEPS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT OF CAPABILITIES 
 
Europe must cope with all kinds of crisis and to be prepared to accept higher risks for 
deployment forces, if speed is not of key importance and if no compiting military priorities 
exists. If European states are able to accept casualties and collateral damage and if political 
consensus is build for deployment forces, then Europe may have great role on international 
scene. If USA’s high war intensity is the unique standard, if risks are to be kept on minimum 
and if high level is needed for sustaining the public support, then Europe may face with greater 
challenges. Greatest potential for increse of capabilities lies in following areas: conflict 
prevention and crisis management, strengthening strategic decision-making, expansion of 
international contact points and intelligence coordination. On the other side, three main issues 
shall be decisive in defying the ESDP’s success: creating political will, promoting partnership 
with NATO and capabilities development. 
Conflict prevention and crisis management. The two threats ESDP is facing are the 
failure to act successfully and the noninvolment of European key actors. European states may 
have difficulties  in decision-making process during crisis development regarding the kind and 
the best way to cope with it. If EU should decide to undertake a military operation means that 
the conflict prevention was unsuccessful. The second threat potentially may have more serious 
and long term consequences than the failure. Mass recesions, collapse of euro or mass 
unemployment contribute for the political attention to be far away from ESDP and influence on 
defence budgets, building capabilities and crisis management aspects. 
 Strengthening the European strategic decision-making. Ideally, one body should 
coordinate all ESDP elements and external relations with states in potentially crisis areas. Only 
when crisis management assets are connected, the conflict prevention is going to be successful. 
Such body needs to include the long-term capabilities development, defence-industrial 
cooperation, police coordination, as well as to coordinate crisis management and intelligence, 
bilateral military cooperation non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and arms trafficking.  
 Expansion of international contact points. EU’s external official should expand its 
international contact points by establishing connections with international organizations (UN, 
OSCE and NATO) and needs to be infromed on all CFSP and ESDP issues and be able to 
contribute. On EU-USA realtions must be given priority, and although priorities and principles 
may vary, EU member-states should not hide anything from USA and vice versa.  
Establishing intelligence coordination. Whatever activity is undertaken by ESDP in 
the pre-crisis or crisis phase, intelligence for strategic decision-making is of highest importance. 
Whether EU-NATO or EU-USA engagement needs coordination or wheter it is a matter of 
autonomous EU operation, EU bodies and member-states should be able to undertake decisions 
based on their own assassments. EU intelligence is needed on two levels - strategic decision and 
operational level - and for two reasons - long-term conflict prevention and active crisis 
management. Common European intelligence capabilities are important step towards more 
effective strategic decision-making for conflict prevention and crisis management. 
Creating political will. ESDP is not going to show any progress if not supported by 
strong political will. The most contemporary crisis are not a direct threat for the territorial 
integrity or survival of European states and actual cure is not always easy to discover. Such 
approach makes possibilities for further development of common European views on crisis 
management. Whether with persuasion or because their security has smaller value for several 
decades, European states, most probably, are not willing to became more militaristic on short od 
middle term.  This does not mean that they lack of actual military culture. In some way, EU is 
step forward than NATO. Despite its imperfections and flaws, no other international 
organization have so many tools, military and civilian, essential for peace-building and peace-
keeping. Certainly that there are differences in member-states interests and visions, but ESDP is 
not facing with some of the acute dilemmas, since its implemented only “out of area”.  
Practical approach towards cooperation with USA and NATO. EU-NATO 
cooperation needs not only a formal agreement on the political front, but also a strategic 
compatibility and practical arrangements, identification of common strategic goals, compatible 
procedures and priorities of highest political level. The alternative for close EU-NATO 
cooperation is in accentuating, principally, EU-USA relations. With wide spectar of security 
elements, EU may become more important partner for USA then the more limited and focused 
European pillar in NATO. In addition, there are missions EU is willing to undertake through 
ESDP in which USA is not showing particular appetite. On one side, these include operations 
where EU has the advantage because of its capability for mobilizing non-military elements, and 
on other side, resolving conflicts in its neighborhood. The danger is conducting ESDP 
operations that might undermine NATO’s success, because there is only one set of forces.  
Development of defence and operational planning. EU is willing to strengthen its 
planning capabilities and develop its own planning process, essential for preparation and 
conducting ESDP missions and oprations. EU’s defence planning, connected with military and 
non-military capabilities, may play great role in increasing European capabilities.  
Capabilities development. Lisbon Treaty help in improvement of capabilities, not only 
for ESDP, but also for NATO. ESDP should be equiped with structures that may go further than 
the already designated ones and to enable produce desirous results. Capabilities should be 
available and prepared when necessary to confront with the increasing security challenges. EU 
should develop defence technological and industrial base, having in mind the fact that the 
majority of operations and missions do not require most developed technology equipment. 
Finaly, EU may face with situations where some member-states cooperate in the area of military 
capabilities, while other prefer to continue focusing on the civilian front. Cooperation and 
mechanisms should be elaborated in order to secure interoperability between civilian and 
military mission components and not to undermine the effectiveness of overall EU approach. 
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